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Hybrid interconnection of iterative bidding and power network dynamics
for frequency regulation and optimal dispatch
Tjerk Stegink, Ashish Cherukuri, Claudio De Persis, Arjan van der Schaft, and Jorge Corte´s
Abstract—This paper considers a real-time electricity market
involving an independent system operator (ISO) and a group of
strategic generators. The ISO operates a market where genera-
tors bid prices at which there are willing to provide power. The
ISO makes power generation assignments with the goal of solving
the economic dispatch problem and regulating the network
frequency. We propose a multi-rate hybrid algorithm for bidding
and market clearing that combines the discrete nature of iterative
bidding with the continuous nature of the frequency evolution
in the power network. We establish sufficient upper bounds on
the inter-event times that guarantee that the proposed algorithm
asymptotically converges to an equilibrium corresponding to an
efficient Nash equilibrium and zero frequency deviation. Our
technical analysis builds on the characterization of the robustness
properties of the continuous-time version of the bidding update
process interconnected with the power network dynamics via the
identification of a novel LISS-Lyapunov function. Simulations on
the IEEE 14-bus system illustrate our results.
I. INTRODUCTION
The dispatch of power generation in the grid has been
traditionally done in a hierarchical fashion. Broadly speaking,
cost efficiency is ensured via market clearing at the upper
layers and frequency regulation is achieved via primary and
secondary controllers at the bottom layers. Research on im-
proving the performance of these layers has mostly developed
independently from each other, motivated by their separation
in time-scales. The increasing penetration of renewables poses
significant challenges to this model of operation because of
its intermittent and uncertain nature. At the same time, the
penetration of renewables also presents an opportunity to
rethink the architecture and its hierarchical separation towards
the goal of improving efficiency and adaptivity. A key aspect
to achieve the integration of different layers is the character-
ization of the robustness properties of the mechanisms used
at each layer, since variables at the upper layers cannot be
assumed in steady state any more at the lower ones. These
considerations motivate our work on iterative bidding schemes
combined with continuous physical network dynamics and
the correctness analysis of the resulting multi-rate hybrid
interconnected system.
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Literature review: The integration of economic dispatch and
frequency regulation in power networks has attracted increas-
ing attention in the last decades. Many recent works [2], [3],
[4], [5], [6], [7], [8] envision merging the design of primary,
secondary, and tertiary control layers for several models of the
power network/micro-grid dynamics with the aim of bridging
the gap between long-term optimization and real-time fre-
quency control. In scenarios where generators are price-takers,
the literature has also explored the use of market mechanisms
to determine the optimal allocation of power generation and
to stabilize the frequency with real-time (locational marginal)
pricing, see [9], [10], [11], [12]. Inspired by the iterative
bidding schemes for strategic generators proposed in [13], that
lead to efficient Nash equilibria where power generation levels
minimize the total cost as intended by the ISO, our work [14]
has shown that the integration with the frequency dynamics
of the network can also be achieved in scenarios where
generators are price-bidders. However, this integration relies
on a continuous-time model for the bidding process, where the
frequency coming from the power network dynamics enters
as a feedback signal in the negotiation process. Instead, we
account here for the necessarily discrete nature of the bidding
process and explore the design of provably correct multi-rate
hybrid implementations that realize this integration.
Statement of contributions: We consider an electrical power
network consisting of an ISO and a group of strategic gener-
ators. The ISO seeks to ensure that the generation meets the
load with the minimum operation cost and the grid frequency
is regulated to its nominal value. Each generator seeks to
maximize its individual profit and does not share its cost
function with anyone. The ISO operates the market, where
generators bid prices at which there are willing to provide
power, and makes power generation assignments based on the
bids and the local frequency measurements. Our goal is to
design mechanisms that ensure the stability of the intercon-
nection between the ISO-generator bidding process and the
physical network dynamics while accounting for the different
nature (iterative in the first case, evolving in continuous time in
the second) of each process. Our starting point is a continuous-
time bid update scheme coupled with the physical dynamics of
the power network whose equilibrium corresponds to an effi-
cient Nash equilibrium and zero frequency deviation. Our first
contribution is the characterization of the robustness properties
of this dynamics against additive disturbances. To achieve this,
we identify a novel local Lyapunov function that includes the
energy function of the closed-loop system. The availability of
this function not only leads us to establish local exponential
convergence to the desired equilibrium, but also allows us
rigorously establish its local input-to-state stability properties.
Building on these results, our second contribution develops
a time-triggered hybrid implementation that combines the
discrete nature of iterative bidding with the continuous nature
of the frequency evolution in the power network. In our design,
we introduce two iteration loops, one (faster) inner-loop for the
bidding process that incorporates at each step the frequency
measurements, and one (slower) outer-loop for the market
clearing and the updates in the power generation levels, that
are sent to the continuous-time power network dynamics. We
refer to this multi-rate hybrid implementation as time-triggered
because we do not necessarily prescribe the time schedules
to be periodic. To analyze its convergence properties, we
regard the time-triggered implementation as an approximation
of the continuous-time dynamics and invoke the robustness
properties of the latter, interpreting as a disturbance their
mismatch. This allows us to derive explicit upper bounds on
the length between consecutive triggering times that guarantee
that the time-triggered implementation remains asymptotically
convergent. The computation of these upper bounds does not
require knowledge of the efficient Nash equilibrium. Simula-
tions on the IEEE 14-bus power network illustrate our results.
Outline: The paper is organized as follows. Section II
introduces the dynamic model of the power network and Sec-
tion III describes the problem setup. Section IV characterizes
the robustness properties of the continuous-time dynamics
resulting from the interconnection of bid updating and network
dynamics. Section V introduces the time-triggered implemen-
tation and identifies sufficient conditions on the inter-event
times that ensure asymptotic convergence to efficient Nash
equilibria. Simulations illustrate the results in Section VI.
Section VII gathers our conclusions and ideas for future work.
The appendices contain the proofs of the main results of the
paper.
Notation: Let R,R≥0,R>0,Z≥0,Z≥1 be the set of real,
nonnegative real, positive real, nonnegative integer, and posi-
tive integer numbers, respectively. For m ∈ Z≥1, we use the
shorthand notation [m] = {1, . . . ,m}. For A ∈ Rm×n, we let
‖A‖ denote the induced 2-norm. Given v ∈ Rn, A = AT ∈
R
n×n, we denote ‖v‖2A := v
TAv. The notation 1 ∈ Rn is used
for the vector whose elements are equal to 1. The Hessian of a
twice-differentiable function f : Rn → R is denoted by ∇2f .
II. POWER NETWORK FREQUENCY DYNAMICS
Here we present the model of the physical power network
that describes the evolution of the grid frequency. The network
is represented by a connected, undirected graph G = (V , E),
where nodes V = [n] represent buses and edges E ⊂ V×V are
the transmission lines connecting the buses. Let m denote the
number of edges, arbitrarily labeled with a unique identifier
in [m]. The ends of each edge are also arbitrary labeled with
‘+’ and ‘-’, so that we can associate to the graph the incidence
matrix D ∈ Rn×m given by
Dik =


+1 if i is the positive end of edge k,
−1 if i is the negative end of edge k,
0 otherwise.
Each bus represents a control area and is assumed to have one
generator and one load. Following [15], the dynamics at the
buses is described by the swing equations (1).
δ˙ = ω
Mω˙ = −DΓ sin(DT δ)−Aω + Pg − Pd
(1)
Here Γ = diag{γ1, . . . , γm} ∈ R
m×m, γk = BijViVj , where
k ∈ [m] corresponds to the edge between nodes i and j. Table I
specifies the meaning of the symbols used in the model (1).
δ ∈ Rn (vector of) voltage phase angles
ω ∈ Rn frequency deviation w.r.t. the nominal frequency
Vi ∈ R>0 voltage magnitude at bus i
Pd ∈ R
n power load
Pg ∈ R
n power generation
M ∈ Rn×n
≥0
diagonal matrix of moments of inertia
A ∈ Rn×n
≥0
diagonal matrix of asynchronous damping constants
Bij ∈ R≥0 negative of the susceptance of transmission line (i, j)
Table I: Parameters and state variables of model (1).
To avoid issues in the stability analysis of (1) due to the
rotational invariance of δ, see e.g., [16], we introduce the new
variable ϕ = DTt δ ∈ R
n−1. Here ϕ represents the voltage
phase angle differences along the edges of a spanning tree of
the graph G with incidence matrix Dt. The physical energy
stored in the transmission lines is given by (2), where D†t =
(DTt Dt)
−1DTt denotes the Moore-Penrose inverse of Dt.
U(ϕ) = −1TΓ cos(DTD†Tt ϕ). (2)
By noting that DtD
†
tD = (I −
1
n
11
T )D = D, the physical
system (1) in the (ϕ, ω)-coordinates takes the form
ϕ˙ = DTt ω
Mω˙ = −Dt∇U(ϕ)−Aω + Pg − Pd
(3)
In the sequel we assume that, for the power generation Pg =
P¯g , there exists an equilibrium col(ϕ¯, ω¯) of (3) that satisfies
DTD†Tt ϕ¯ ∈ (−
π
2 ,
π
2 )
m. The latter assumption is standard and
often referred to as the security constraint [15].
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
In this section we formulate the problem statement and then
discuss the paper objectives. We start from the power network
model introduced in Section II and then explain the game-
theoretic model describing the interaction between the ISO
and the generators following the exposition of [17], [13].
The cost incurred by generator i ∈ [n] in producing Pgi
units of power is given by
Ci(Pgi) :=
1
2
qiP
2
gi + ciPgi, (4)
where qi > 0 and ci ≥ 0. The total network cost is then
C(Pg) :=
∑
i∈[n]
Ci(Pgi) =
1
2
PTg QPg + c
TPg, (5)
with Q = diag{q1, . . . , qn} and c = col(c1, . . . , cn). Given
the cost (5) and the power loads Pd, the ISO seeks to solve
the economic dispatch problem
minimize
Pg
C(Pg), (6a)
subject to 1TPg = 1
TPd, (6b)
and, at the same time, regulate the network frequency to its
nominal value. Since the function C is strongly convex, there
exists a unique optimizer P ∗g of (6). However, we assume
that the generators are strategic and they do not reveal their
cost functions to anyone, including the ISO. Consequently,
the ISO is unable to determine the optimizer of (6). Instead, it
determines the power dispatch according to a market clearing
procedure in which each generator submits bids to the ISO.
We consider price-based bidding: each generator i ∈ [n]
submits the price per unit electricity bi ∈ R at which it
is willing to provide power. Based on these bids, the ISO
finds the power generation allocation that minimizes the total
generator payment while meeting the load. More precisely,
given the bid b = col(b1, . . . , bn), the ISO solves
minimize
Pg
bTPg, (7a)
subject to 1TPg = 1
TPd. (7b)
The optimization problem (7) is linear and may in general
have multiple (unbounded) solutions. Among these solutions,
let P
opt
g (b) = col(P
opt
g1 (b), . . . , P
opt
gn (b)) be the optimizer of
(7) the ISO selects given bids b. Knowing this process, each
generator i aims to bid a quantity bi to maximize its payoff
Πi(bi, P
opt
gi (b)) := P
opt
gi (b)bi − Ci(P
opt
gi (b)). (8)
For an unbounded optimizer we have Πi(bi,±∞) = −∞.
To analyze the clearing of the market, we resort to tools
from game theory [18]. To this end, we define the inelastic
electricity market game:
• Players: the set of generators [n].
• Action: for each player i ∈ [n], the bid bi ∈ R.
• Payoff: for each player i ∈ [n], the payoff Πi in (8).
For the bid vector we interchangeably use the notation b ∈ Rn
and (bi, b−i) ∈ Rn, where b−i represents the bids of all players
except i. A bid profile b∗ ∈ Rn is a Nash equilibrium if there
exists an optimizer P optg (b∗) of (7) such that ∀i ∈ [n],
Πi(bi, P
opt
gi (bi, b
∗
−i)) ≤ Πi(b
∗
i , P
opt
gi (b
∗))
for all bi 6= b∗i and all optimizers P
opt
gi (bi, b
∗
−i) of (7). In par-
ticular, we are interested in bid profiles that can be associated
to economic dispatch. More specifically, a bid b∗ ∈ Rn is
efficient is a bid if there exists an optimizer P ∗g of (6) which
is also an optimizer of (7) given bids b = b∗ and
P ∗gi = argmax
Pgi
{Pgib
∗
i − Ci(Pgi)} for all i ∈ [n]. (9)
A bid b∗ is an efficient Nash equilibrium if it is both efficient
and a Nash equilibrium. At the efficient Nash equilibrium,
the optimal generation allocation determined by (6) coincides
with the production that the generators are willing to provide,
maximizing their profit (8). Following the same arguments
as in the proof of [17, Lemma 3.2], one can establish the
existence and uniqueness of the efficient Nash equilibrium.
Proposition III.1. (Existence and uniqueness of efficient Nash
equilibrium): Let (P ∗g , λ
∗) be a primal-dual optimizer of (6),
then b∗ = ∇C(P ∗g ) = 1λ
∗ is the unique efficient Nash
equilibrium of the inelastic electricity market game.
In the scenario described above, neither the ISO nor the in-
dividual strategic generators are able to determine the efficient
Nash equilibrium beforehand. Our goal is then to design an
online bidding algorithm where ISO and generators iteratively
exchange information about the bids and the generation quan-
tities before the market is cleared and dispatch commands are
sent. The algorithm should be truly implementable, meaning
that it should account for the discrete nature of the bidding
process, and at the same time ensure that network frequency,
governed by the continuous-time power system dynamics, is
regulated to its nominal value. The combination of these two
aspects leads us to adopt a hybrid implementation strategy to
tackle the problem.
IV. ROBUSTNESS OF THE CONTINUOUS-TIME BID AND
POWER-SETPOINT UPDATE SCHEME
In this section, we introduce a continuous-time dynamics
that prescribes a policy for bid updates paired with the
frequency dynamics of the power network whose equilib-
rium corresponds to an efficient Nash equilibrium and zero
frequency deviation. In this scheme, generators update their
bids in a decentralized fashion based on the power generation
quantities received by the ISO, while the ISO changes the
generation quantities depending on both the generator bids
and the network frequency. This design is a simplified version
of the one proposed in our previous work [14]. The main
contribution of our treatment here is the identification of a
novel Lyapunov function that, beyond helping establish local
exponential convergence, allows us to characterize the input-
to-state stability properties of the dynamics. We build on
this characterization later to develop our time-triggered hybrid
implementation that solves the problem outlined in Section III.
A. Bidding process coupled with physical network dynamics
Recall from Section III that given bid bi, generator i ∈
[n] wants to produce the amount of power that maximizes its
individual profit, given by
P desgi := argmax
Pgi
{biPgi − Ci(Pgi)} = q
−1
i (bi − ci) (10)
Hence, if the ISO wants generator i to produce more power
than its desired quantity, that is Pgi > P
des
gi , generator i will
increase its bid, and vice versa. Bearing this rationale in mind,
the generators update their bids according to
Tbb˙ = Pg −Q
−1b+Q−1c. (11a)
Here Tb ∈ Rn×n is a diagonal positive definite matrix. Next,
we provide an update law for the ISO depending on the bid
b ∈ Rn and the local frequency of the power network. The
ISO updates its actions according to
TgP˙g = 1λ− b+ ρ11
T (Pd − Pg)− σ
2ω
τλλ˙ = 1
T (Pd − Pg)
(11b)
with parameters ρ, σ, τλ ∈ R>0 and where Tg ∈ Rn×n is a
diagonal positive definite gain matrix.
The intuition behind the dynamics (11b) is explained as
follows. If generator i bids higher than the Lagrange multiplier
λ (sometimes referred to as the shadow price [19]) associated
to (7b), then the power generation (setpoint) of node i is
decreased, and vice versa. By adding the term with ρ > 0,
one can enhance the convergence rate of (11b), see e.g., [20].
We add the feedback signal −σ2ω to compensate for the
frequency deviations in the physical system. Interestingly,
albeit we do not pursue this here, the dynamics (11) could also
be implemented in a distributed way without the involvement
of a central regulating authority like the ISO.
For the remainder of the paper, we assume that there exists
an equilibrium x¯ = col(ϕ¯, ω¯, b¯, P¯g, λ¯) of (3)-(11) such that
DTD†Tt ϕ¯ ∈ (−π/2, π/2)
m (cf. Section II). Note that this
equilibrium satisfies
λ¯ =
1
T (Pd +Q
−1c)
1TQ−11
> 0, ω¯ = 0, b¯ = 1λ¯,
P¯g = Q
−1
1λ¯−Q−1c, 1T P¯g = 1
TPd.
(12)
In particular, at the steady state, the frequency deviation is
zero, the power balance 1T P¯g = 1
TPd is satisfied, and 1λ¯ =
b¯ = ∇C(P¯g), implying that P¯g is a primal optimizer of (6) and
b¯ is an efficient Nash equilibrium by Proposition III.1. Hence,
at steady state the generators do not have any incentive to
deviate from the equilibrium bid.
B. Local input-to-state (LISS) stability
While the ISO dynamics (11b) is a saddle-point dynamics of
the linear optimization problem (7) (and hence, potentially un-
stable), we show next that the interconnection of the physical
power network dynamics (3) with the bidding process (11)
is locally exponentially stable and, furthermore, robust to
additive disturbances. For x = col(ϕ, ω, b, Pg, λ), define the
function
V (x) = U(ϕ)− (ϕ− ϕ¯)T∇U(ϕ¯)− U(ϕ¯) + 12ω
TMω
+ 12σ2 (‖b− b¯‖
2
Tb
+ ‖Pg − P¯g‖
2
Tg
+ ‖λ− λ¯‖2τλ). (13)
Then the closed-loop system obtained by combining (3)
and (11) is compactly written as
x˙ = F (x) = Q−1AQ−1∇V (x) (14)
with Q = QT = blockdiag(I,M, Tb
σ
,
Tg
σ
, τλ
σ
) > 0 and
A =


0 DTt 0 0 0
−Dt −A 0 σI 0
0 0 −Q−1 I 0
0 −σI −I −ρ11T 1
0 0 0 −1T 0

 .
By exploiting the structure of the system, we obtain the
dissipation inequality
V˙ =
1
2
(∇V (x))TQ−1(A+AT )Q−1∇V (x) ≤ 0 (15)
However, since R := − 12 (A + A
T ) is only positive semi-
definite, V is not strictly decreasing along the trajectories
of (14). Nevertheless, one can invoke the LaSalle Invariance
Principle to characterize the local asymptotic convergence
properties of the dynamics, cf. [14]. Here, we show that, in
fact, the dynamics is locally input-to-state (LISS) stable, as
defined in [21], and therefore robust to additive disturbances.
Our key tool to establish this is the identification of a LISS-
Lyapunov function, which in general is far from trivial for
dynamics that involve saddle-point dynamics. To this end,
consider the system
x˙ = F (x) +Bd (16)
with B ∈ R4n×q and a disturbance signal d ∈ Rq . In the
following result, we use the function V to construct an LISS-
Lyapunov function for the system (16).
Theorem IV.1. (LISS-Lyapunov function for the intercon-
nected dynamics): Consider the interconnected dynamics (16)
and define the function
Wǫ(x) = V (x) + ǫ0ǫ1(ϕ− ϕ¯)
TD†tMω (17)
− ǫ0ǫ2
σ2
(b− b¯)TTg(Pg − P¯g)−
ǫ0ǫ3
σ2
(λ− λ¯)1TTg(Pg − P¯g),
with parameters ǫ = col(ǫ0, ǫ1, ǫ2, ǫ3) ∈ R4>0 and V given by
(13). Given the equilibrium x¯ = col(ϕ¯, ω¯, b¯, P¯g, λ¯) of (14), let
η¯ = DTD†Tt ϕ¯. For γ such that ‖η¯‖∞ < γ <
π
2 , define the
closed convex set
Ω = {x = col(ϕ, ω, b, Pg, λ) |D
TD†Tt ϕ ∈ [−γ, γ]
m}. (18)
Then there exist sufficiently small ǫ such that Wǫ is an LISS-
Lyapunov function of (16) on Ω. In particular, there exist
constants α, χ, c1, c2 > 0 such that for all x ∈ Ω and all
d satisfying ‖d‖ ≤ χ‖x− x¯‖,
1
2c1‖x− x¯‖
2 ≤Wǫ(x) ≤
1
2c2‖x− x¯‖
2, (19a)
(∇Wǫ(x))
T (F (x) +Bd) ≤ −α‖x− x¯‖2. (19b)
We refer to Appendix A for the proof of Theorem IV.1.
Using the characterization (19) and [22, Theorem 4.10], each
trajectory of (14) initialized in a compact level set contained in
Ω exponentially converges to the equilibrium x¯ corresponding
to economic dispatch and the efficient Nash equilibrium.
Moreover, we exploit the local ISS property of (16) guaranteed
by Theorem IV.1 next to develop a time-triggered hybrid
implementation.
V. TIME-TRIGGERED IMPLEMENTATION: ITERATIVE BID
UPDATE AND MARKET CLEARING
In realistic implementations, the bidding process between
the ISO and the generators is not performed continuously.
Given the availability of digital communications, it is reason-
able to instead model it as an iterative process. Building on
the continuous-time bidding dynamics proposed in Section IV,
here we develop a time-triggered hybrid implementation that
combines the discrete nature of bidding with the continuous
nature of the frequency evolution in the power network. We
consider two time-scales, one (faster) for the bidding process
that incorporates at each step the frequency measurements, and
another one (slower) for the market clearing and updates of
the power generation levels that are sent to the power network
dynamics. We refer to this implementation as time-triggered
because we do not necessarily prescribe the time schedules to
be periodic in order to guarantee that the asymptotic stability
properties are retained by the hybrid implementation.
A. Algorithm description
We start with an informal description of the iterative update
scheme between the ISO and the generators, and the intercon-
nection with the dynamics of the power network.
[Informal description]: The algorithm has two time
indices, k to label the iterations on the bidding
process and l to label the iteration in the market
clearing process that updates the power setpoints.
At each iteration l ∈ Z≥0, ISO and generators
are involved in an iterative process where, at each
subiteration k, generators send a bid to the ISO.
Once the ISO has obtained the bids and the network
frequency measurements at time tlk, it computes
the new potential generation allocations, denoted
P k+1g ∈ R
n, and sends the corresponding one to
each generator. At the (k + 1)-th subiteration, each
generator adjust its bid based on their previous bid
and the generation allocation received from the ISO
at time tlk+1. Once k = Nl ∈ Z≥1 at time t
l
Nl
, the
market is cleared, meaning that the bidding process
is reset (i.e., k = 0), the power generations in the
swing equations are updated according to the current
setpoints PNlg , and the index l moves to l + 1.
Figure 1 shows the two iteration layers in the update
scheme. The evolution of the frequency occurs in continuous
time according to (3). To relate iteration numbers with time
instances on R, we consider time sequences of the form
{{tlk}
Nl
k=0}
∞
l=0 for Nl ∈ Z≥1 and l ∈ Z≥0}, satisfying
tlk − t
l
k−1 > 0, t
l+1
0 = t
l
Nl
(20)
for all l ∈ Z≥0 and all k ∈ [Nl]. Algorithm 1 formally
describes the iterative updates of the bidding process between
the generators and the ISO.
For analysis purposes, we find it convenient to represent the
dynamics resulting from the combination of Algorithm 1 and
the network dynamics (3) as the time-triggered continuous-
time system
ϕ˙(t) = DTt ω(t),
Mω˙(t) = −Dt∇U(ϕ(t)) −Aω(t) + Pg(t
l
0)− Pd,
Tbb˙(t) = Pg(t
l
k)−Q
−1b(tlk)−Q
−1c, (21)
TgP˙g(t) = 1λ(t
l
k)− b(t
l
k)− σ
2ω(tlk) + ρ11
T (Pd − Pg(t
l
k)),
τλλ˙(t) = 1
T (Pd − Pg(t
l
k)),
Algorithm 1: ITERATIVE BID UPDATE AND MARKET
CLEARING ALGORITHM
Executed by: generators i ∈ [n] and ISO
Data : time sequence {{tlk}
Nl
k=0}
∞
l=0; cost function
(4) for each generator i; frequency deviation
ω(tlk) at each time t
l
k and load Pd for ISO
Initialize : each generator i selects arbitrarily b0i ≥ ci,
sets k = 0, l = 0, and jumps to step 6; ISO
selects arbitrary P 0gi > 0, λ
0
i > 0, sets
k = 0, l = 0 and waits for step 8
1 while l ≥ 0 do
2 while k ≥ 0, k < Nl do
3 /* For each generator i: */
4 Receive P kgi from ISO at t
l
k; Set
5 bk+1i = b
k
i + (t
l
k+1 − t
l
k)T
−1
bi (P
k
gi − q
−1
i (b
k
i + ci))
6 Send bk+1i to the ISO; set k = k + 1
7 /* For ISO: */
8 Receive bki , ωi(t
l
k) from each i ∈ [n] at t
l
k
9 Set P k+1gi = P
k
gi + (t
l
k+1 − t
l
k)T
−1
gi (λ
k − bki −
σ2ωi(t
l
k) + ρ
∑
i∈[n](Pdi − P
k
gi)) for all i ∈ [n]
λk+1 = λk +
tlk+1−t
l
k
τλ
∑
i∈[n](Pdi − P
k
gi)
10 Send P k+1gi to each i ∈ [n], set k = k + 1
11 end
12 Set Pgi(t) = P
Nl
gi in (3) ∀i ∈ [n], ∀t ∈ [t
l
Nl
, tl+1Nl+1)
13 Set b0i = b
Nl
i , P
0
gi = P
Nl
gi , λ
0
i = λ
Nl
i for each i ∈ [n]
14 Set l = l + 1, k = 0
15 end
for t ∈ [tlk, t
l
k+1) ⊂ [t
l
0, t
l+1
0 ), l ∈ Z≥0, k ∈ {0, . . . , Nl − 1}.
We write the system (21) compactly in the form
x˙(t) = f(x(t)) + g(x(tlk)) + h(x(t
l
0)) (22)
with
f(x) = col(DTt ω,−M
−1(Dt∇U(ϕ) +Aω + Pd), 0, 0, 0),
g(x) = col(0, 0, T−1b (Pg −Q
−1b−Q−1c),
T−1g (1λ− b− σ
2ω + ρ11T (Pd − Pg)), τ
−1
λ 1
T (Pd − Pg)),
h(x) = col(0,M−1Pg, 0, 0, 0).
With this notation, note that the continuous-time dynam-
ics (14) corresponds to
x˙(t) = f(x(t)) + g(x(t)) + h(x(t)). (23)
Since supϕ∈Rn−1 ‖∇
2U(ϕ)‖ < ∞ and g, h are linear, it
follows that f, g, h are globally Lipschitz (we denote by
Lf , Lg, Lh their Lipschitz constants, respectively). When
viewed as a continuous-time system, the dynamics (21) has
a discontinuous right-hand side, and therefore we consider its
solutions in the Carathe´odory sense, cf. [23].
B. Sufficient condition on triggering times for stability
In this section we establish conditions on the time sequence
that guarantee that the solutions of (21) are well-defined and
t01 t
0
2
t0k−1 t
0
k
t0k+1 t
1
1 t
l
k
t0N0 = t
1
0 t
l
Nl
= tl+10t
0
0 = 0 . . . .
power network dynamics (3) t
ISO-generator bidding process (Algorithm 1)ISO-generator
bidding process
power network
dynamics
frequency
deviations
power
generation
setpoints
Figure 1: Relation between time and iteration numbers in the time-triggered system (21). The lower time-axis corresponds to the continuous-time physical
system (3) while the upper one corresponds to the time sequence {{tl
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l=0
of the ISO-generator bidding process given in Algorithm 1. The arrows
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retain the convergence properties of (14). Specifically, we
determine a sufficient condition on the inter-sampling times
tlk+1 − t
l
k for bidding and t
l+1
k − t
l
k for market clearing that
ensure local asymptotic convergence of (22) to the equilib-
rium x¯ of the continuous-time system (14).
Our strategy to accomplish this relies on the robustness
properties of (14) characterized in Theorem IV.1 and the fact
that the time-triggered implementation, represented by (22),
can be regarded as an approximation of the continuous-time
dynamics, represented by (23). We use the Lyapunov function
Wǫ defined by (17) and examine the mismatch between both
dynamics to derive upper bounds on the inter-event times
that guarantee that Wǫ is strictly decreasing along the time-
triggered system (21).
Theorem V.1. (Local asymptotic stability of time-triggered
implementation): Consider the time-triggered implementa-
tion (21) of the interconnection between the ISO-generator
bidding processes and the power network dynamics. With the
notation of Theorem IV.1, let
ξ¯ :=
1
Lf + Lg
log
(
1 +
β(Lf + Lg)
L(LWLh + β)
)
, (24)
ζ¯ :=
1
Lf
log
(
1 +
Lf (α− β)
Lg(LLW + α) + (α− β)(Lf + Lg)
)
,
where 0 < β < α, L := Lf+Lg+Lh, and LW is the Lipschitz
constant of ∇Wǫ. Assume the time sequence {{tlk}
Nl
k=0}
∞
l=0
satisfies, for some ζ ∈ (0, ζ) and ξ ∈ (0, ξ),
ζ ≤ tl+10 − t
l
0 ≤ ζ and ξ ≤ t
l
k − t
l
k−1 ≤ ξ, (25)
for all l ∈ Z≥0 and k ∈ [Nl]. Then, x¯ is locally asymptotically
stable under (21).
We refer the reader to Appendix B for the proof of The-
orem V.1. The uniform lower bounds ζ and ξ in (25) ensure
that the solutions of the time-triggered implementation (21)
are well-defined, avoiding Zeno behavior. Theorem V.1 implies
that convergence is guaranteed for any constant stepsize imple-
mentation, where the sufficiently small stepsize satisfies (25).
However, the result of Theorem V.1 is more general and does
not require constant stepsizes. Another interesting observation
is that the upper bounds can be calculated without requiring
any information about the equilibrium x¯. This is desirable,
as this equilibrium is not known beforehand and must be
determined by the algorithm itself.
VI. SIMULATIONS
In this section we illustrate the convergence properties of
the interconnected time-triggered system (21). We consider the
IEEE 14-bus power network depicted in Figure 2, where each
node has one generator and one load according to model (1).
We assume costs at each node i ∈ [14] of the form
Ci(Pgi) =
1
2
qiP
2
gi + ciPgi
with qi > 0 and ci ≥ 0. In the original IEEE 14-bus bench-
mark model, nodes 1, 2, 3, 6, 8 have synchronous generators
while the other nodes are load nodes and have no power
generation. We replicate this by suitably choosing the cost
at the load nodes such that the optimizer of the economic
dispatch problem (6) is zero at them. In addition, we choose
Mi ∈ [4, 5.5] for generator nodes i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 6, 8} and
Mi ≪ 1 for the load nodes. We set Ai ∈ [1.5, 2.5], Vi ∈
[1, 1.06], Tbi ∈ [0.0005, 0.001], Tgi = 13.5 for all i ∈ [14]
and ρ = 900. The other parameter values for the ISO
dynamics (11b) are τλ = 0.0004, ρ = 3, σ = 17.
1 2 3
45
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8
91011
12 13 14
Figure 2: Schematic of the modified IEEE 14-bus benchmark. Each edge
represents a transmission line. Red nodes represent loads. All the other nodes
represent synchronous generators, with different colors that match the ones
used in Figures 3 and 5. The physical dynamics are modeled by (1).
At time t = 0 s, the load (in MW’s) is given by
Pd = (0, 20, 86, 43, 7, 10, 0, 0, 27, 8, 3, 6, 12, 14).
Initially, we set (q1, q2, q3, q6, q8) = (22, 128, 45, 60, 30),
(c1, c2, c3, c6, c8) = (7.5, 7.5, 7.5, 7.5, 7.5) and qi =
1500, ci = 26 for the remaining nodes. The time-triggered
system (21) is initialized at steady state at the optimal gener-
ation level
(Pg1, Pg2, Pg3, Pg6, Pg8) = (85, 15, 42, 31, 63)
and with Pgi = 0 for all other nodes. Figures 3-5 depict the
simulation of the time-triggered system for different triggering
times. At t = 1 s all the loads are increased by 10% and we
set ci = 28 for the load nodes. As observed in all figures,
the trajectories converge to a new efficient equilibrium with
optimal power generation level
(Pg1, Pg2, Pg3, Pg6, Pg8) = (94, 16, 46, 34, 69)
and Pgi = 0 for all other nodes. Furthermore, at steady
state the generators all bid equal to the Lagrange multiplier
which, by Proposition III.1, corresponds to an efficient Nash
equilibrium.
At t = 15 s the cost functions of the generators
are changed to (q1, q2, q3, q6, q8) = (23, 116, 48, 63, 38),
(c1, c2, c3, c6, c8) = (7.5, 6, 13.5, 15, 10.5) and qi =
1500, ci = 33 for the remaining nodes. As a result, the
optimal dispatch of power changes. Due to the changes of the
power generation, a temporary frequency imbalance occurs.
As illustrated in Figures 3-5, the power generations converge
to the new optimal steady state given by
(Pg1, Pg2, Pg3, Pg6, Pg8) = (108, 23, 40, 28, 60).
In addition, we observe that after each change of either the
load or the cost function, the frequency is stabilized and
the bids converge to a new efficient Nash equilibrium. The
fact that the frequency transients are better in Figures 3-
4 (with inter-event times of maximal 2ms for bidding and
on average respectively 50ms, 62.5ms for market clearing)
than in Figure 5 (with inter-event times of 2ms for bidding
and 160ms for market clearing) is to be expected given the
longer inter-event times in the second case. A slight increase
in the inter-event times for Figure 5 in either bid updating or
market clearing time result in an unstable system. Figure 6
illustrates the evolution of the interconnected system with the
primary/secondary and tertiary control layers separated and its
loss of efficiency compared to the proposed integrated design.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has studied the joint operation of the economic
dispatch and frequency regulation layers, which are tradition-
ally separated in the control of power networks. The starting
point of our design was a continuous-time bid update scheme
coupled with the frequency dynamics whose equilibrium cor-
responds to an efficient Nash equilibrium and zero frequency
deviation. Building on the identification of a novel LISS-
Lyapunov function for this dynamics, we have characterized its
robustness properties against additive disturbances. We have
exploited the LISS-property to propose a provably correct
multi-rate hybrid implementation that combines the iterative
nature of the fast bid updates and the slower power setpoint
updates with the continuous frequency network dynamics. Our
results show that real-time iterative bidding can successfully
be interconnected with frequency control to increase efficiency
while retaining stability of the power system.
Future work will incorporate elastic demand, generator
bounds, and power flow constraints in the formulation, develop
distributed and opportunistic self-triggered implementations
of the proposed dynamics, and characterize the convergence
properties of data-driven optimization algorithms.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM IV.1
We structure the proof of Theorem IV.1 in two separate
parts, corresponding to the inequalities (19a) and (19b), re-
spectively.
A. Positive definiteness of Lyapunov function Wǫ
Let x¯ be the equilibrium of (14) satisfying the hypothesis.
We now prove the existence of constants c1, c2, ǫ0 > 0 such
that (19a) holds, given the constants ǫ1, ǫ2, ǫ3 > 0. The
Hessian of Wǫ (eq. (17)) is given by a block-diagonal matrix
∇2Wǫ(x) = blockdiag(H1(ϕ), H2) with the upper left block
given by
H1(ϕ) =
[
∇2U(ϕ) ǫ0ǫ1D
†
tM
ǫ0ǫ1MD
†T
t M
]
and the lower right block is given by
H2 =
1
σ2

 Tb −ǫ0ǫ2Tg 0−ǫ0ǫ2Tg Tg −ǫ0ǫ3Tg1
0 −ǫ0ǫ31TTg τλ

 .
We will now show that there exists sufficiently small ǫ0 such
that H1(ϕ), H2 are both positive definite for all x ∈ Ω. To
this end, let us define the function
U(η) = D†tDΓ cos(η)D
TD†Tt (26)
and note that U(DTD†Tt ϕ) = ∇
2U(ϕ), implying that 0 <
U(γ1) ≤ ∇2U(ϕ) ≤ ∇2U(0) = U(0) for all x ∈ Ω, see (18).
Consequently, for D := ǫ0ǫ1D
†
tM , we have[
U(γ1) D
DT M
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
K1
≤ H1(ϕ) ≤
[
U(0) D
DT M
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
K2
, ∀x ∈ Ω.
By considering the Schur complements, the matrices K1, H2
are shown to be positive definite by choosing ǫ0 > 0 suffi-
ciently small such that
U(γ1)− ǫ20ǫ
2
1D
†
tMD
†T
t > 0,
Tb − ǫ
2
0ǫ
2
2Tg > 0,
τλ − ǫ
2
0ǫ
2
31
TTbTg(Tb − ǫ
2
0ǫ
2
2Tg)
−1
1 > 0.
(27)
Next we define
c1 := min{λmin(K1), λmin(H2)}, (28)
c2 := max{λmax(K2), λmax(H2)}, (29)
where λmin(A), λmax(A) denote the smallest and largest
eigenvalue of the matrix A ∈ Rn×n. Note that c1, c2 > 0
and the following holds
0 < c1I ≤ ∇
2Wǫ(x) ≤ c2I, ∀x ∈ Ω (30)
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(a) Evolution of the frequency deviations. After
each sudden supply-demand imbalance, frequency
is restored to its nominal value.
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(b) Evolution of the nodal power generations. After
each change in the network, the power generation
quantities converge to the optimal values deter-
mined by (6).
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(c) Evolution of the bids and the Lagrange mul-
tiplier (dashed black line). As shown, the bids
converge to the unique efficient Nash equilibrium.
Figure 3: Simulations of the interconnection between the iterative bidding mechanism and the power network dynamics modeled by the time-triggered system
(21). The colors in the graph corresponds to the nodes as depicted in Figure 2. We choose identical inter-event times given by tl
k
− tl
k−1
= 2ms, tl
0
− tl−1
0
=
50ms for all l ∈ Z≥1, k ∈ [25]. As expected, the time-triggered system is asymptotically stable for sufficiently fast updates.
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(c) Evolution of the bids & Lagrange multiplier.
Figure 4: Simulations of the time-triggered system (21) under time-varying step sizes. We choose the time between two consecutive bid iterations randomly
between 0.5ms ≤ tl
k
− tl
k−1
≤ 2ms, for all l ∈ Z≥1, k ∈ [Nl], and we choose the number of bid iterations Nl ∈ Z before market clearing occurs randomly
in the interval [20, 80]. Since the step sizes are sufficiently small, and therefore the mismatch of the time-triggered system with its continuous-time variant,
the performance is similar compared to Figure 3.
Note that since Wǫ(x¯) = 0,∇Wǫ(x¯) = 0, we have
Wǫ(x) = Wǫ(x) −Wǫ(x¯)
= (x− x¯)T
∫ 1
0
(
∇Wǫ((x− x¯)T + x¯)−∇Wǫ(x¯)
)
dT
= (x− x¯)T
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
T∇2Wǫ((x− x¯)Tθ + x¯)dTdθ(x− x¯).
Since Ω is convex, it follows that xTθ + (1 − Tθ)x¯ ∈ Ω for
all T, θ ∈ [0, 1], x ∈ Ω. Consequently, by (30) we have
c1I ≤ ∇
2Wǫ(xTθ + (1 − Tθ)x¯) ≤ c2I, ∀T, θ ∈ [0, 1],
and ∀x ∈ Ω. Since
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
TdθdT = 12 , inequality (19a)
follows.
B. Dissipation inequality
Here we establish the inequality (19b). First we consider the
case without disturbance, i.e., d = 0. Given the equilibrium
x¯ of (14), we define x˜ := x − x¯ and likewise ϕ˜, ω˜, b˜, P˜g, λ˜.
Then, the system (14) reads as
˙˜ϕ = DTt ω˜,
M ˙˜ω = −Dt(∇U(ϕ)−∇U(ϕ¯))−Aω˜ + P˜g,
Tb
˙˜b = P˜g −Q
−1b˜,
Tg
˙˜Pg = 1λ˜− b˜− ρ11
T P˜g − σ
2ω˜,
τλ
˙˜
λ = −1T P˜g.
In addition, note that Wǫ (eq. (17)) takes the form
Wǫ(x) = V (x) + Vǫ(x), (31)
Vǫ(x) = ǫ0ǫ1ϕ˜
TD†tMω −
ǫ0ǫ2
σ2
b˜TTgP˜g −
ǫ0ǫ3
σ2
λ˜1TTgP˜g.
(32)
Next, we determine the time-derivative of the individual terms
of the candidate Lyapunov function Wǫ.
(0): First, observe from (15) that
V˙ = −ωTAω −
1
σ2
(b− b¯)TQ−1(b− b¯)
−
ρ
σ2
(Pg − P¯g)
T
11
T (Pg − P¯g).
(1): The time-derivative of the first term of Vǫ satisfies
d
dt
ϕ˜TD†tMω = ω˜
TMD†Tt D
T
t ω˜
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(a) Compared to Figure 3a, there are more os-
cillations and a larger overshoot of the frequency
deviations.
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(b) Evolution of the power generations at each
node.
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(c) Evolution of the bids and the Lagrange multi-
plier. Compared to Figure 3c, more oscillations in
the bids occur.
Figure 5: Simulations of the time-triggered system (21). Here we consider the case tl
k
− tl
k−1
= 2ms, tl
0
− tl−1
0
= 160ms for all l ∈ Z≥1, k ∈ [80]. The
scenario is the same as in Figure 3. In this case however, the interconnected time-triggered system is only marginally stable; a small increase in either of the
inter-event times results in an unstable system.
Time (s)
0 10 20 30
-0.02
-0.01
0
0.01
Frequency deviation (Hz)
(a) Evolution of the frequency deviations. Com-
pared to Figures 3a-4a, there are more oscillations
in the frequency deviations.
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(b) Evolution of each power generation. After
primary and secondary controllers are activated at
t = 1 s, optimal power sharing is lost.
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(c) Evolution of the total generation costs (in
black) compared to the optimal values calculated
by (6). Activation of primary/secondary control,
and changes in the cost function result in a loss
of efficiency.
Figure 6: Simulations of swing equations with the primary/secondary and tertiary control layers separated. At time t = 1 s, the load is increased as in Figure 3
and decentralized primary/secondary controllers are activated to regulate the frequency but, as a result, optimal power sharing is lost. At t = 14 s the tertiary
control layer is activated by resetting the setpoints optimally. After the change of the cost functions at t = 15 s, economic optimality is temporary lost again
until the next time the tertiary control layer is activated (typically in the order of minutes).
− ϕ˜TD†tDt(∇U(ϕ) −∇U(ϕ¯))− ϕ˜
TD†tAω˜ + ϕ˜
TD†t P˜g.
By exploiting D†tDt = I , the second term is rewritten as
−ϕ˜TD†tDt(∇U(ϕ)−∇U(ϕ¯)) = −ϕ˜
TU(ϕ)ϕ˜T
where we used that ∇U(ϕ)−∇U(ϕ¯) = U(ϕ)(ϕ − ϕ¯) with
U(ϕ) =
∫ 1
0
∇2U((ϕ − ϕ¯)θ + ϕ¯)dθ. (33)
Since U(ϕ) ≥ U(1γ) = D†tDΓ cos(1γ)D
TD†Tt (see eq. (26))
for all x ∈ Ω, we obtain
d
dt
ϕ˜TD†tMω ≤ ω˜
TMD†Tt D
T
t ω˜ − ϕ˜
T
U(1γ)ϕ˜T
− ϕ˜TD†tAω˜ + ϕ˜
TD†t P˜g.
(2): For the second term of Vǫ the following holds:
d
dt
b˜TTgP˜g = P˜
T
g TgbP˜g − P˜
T
g TgbQ
−1b˜+ b˜T1λ˜
− b˜T b˜− ρb˜T11T P˜g − σ
2b˜T ω˜,
where we define Tgb := TgT
−1
b .
(3): Similarly, by defining Tgλ := TgT
−1
λ we obtain
d
dt
λ˜1TTgP˜g = −P˜
T
g Tgλ11
T P˜g + nλ˜
2 − λ˜1T b˜
− ρnλ˜1T P˜g − σ
2λ˜1T ω˜.
By combining the above calculations, we can show that the
time-derivative of Wǫ satisfies
W˙ǫ = V˙ + V˙ǫ ≤
1
2
ǫ0(x− x¯)
TPTΞǫP(x− x¯).
where Ξǫ is given by (34) (see page 10), P takes the form
P =


0 I 0 0 0
0 0 1
σ
I 0 0
0 0 0 1
σ
I 0
0 0 0 0 1
σ
I 0 0 0 0

 ,
and M := MD†Tt D
T
t + DtD
†
tM,T := Tgλ11
T + 11TTgλ.
Next, we will show that there exists ǫ0, ǫ1, ǫ2, ǫ3 > 0 such that
Ξǫ =


ω b/σ Pg/σ λ/σ ϕ
ω 2
ǫ0
A− ǫ1M −ǫ2σI 0 −ǫ3σ1 ǫ1AD
†T
t
b
σ
−ǫ2σI −2ǫ2I +
2
ǫ0
Q−1 −ǫ2(Q−1Tgb + ρ11T ) (ǫ2 − ǫ3)1 0
Pg
σ
0 −ǫ2(TgbQ−1 + ρ11T ) 2ǫ2Tgb +
2
ǫ0
ρ11T − ǫ3T −ǫ3nρ1 −ǫ1σD
†T
t
λ
σ
−ǫ3σ1T (ǫ2 − ǫ3)1T −ǫ3nρ1T 2nǫ3 0
ϕ ǫ1D
†
tA 0 −ǫ1σD
†
t 0 2ǫ1U(1γ)


(34)
Ξǫ is positive definite. This can be done by successive use
of the Schur complement. In particular, for A ∈ Rn×n, B ∈
R
n×m, C ∈ Rm×m, β > 0, recall that[
βA B
BT C
]
> 0 ⇐⇒ C > 0 & βA −BC−1BT > 0.
For successively applying this result to Ξǫ, given by (34), let
us first fix ǫ1, ǫ3 > 0. Then ǫ2 can be chosen sufficiently large
such that lower-right 3 × 3 block submatrix of Ξǫ is positive
definite. Then we can choose a ǫ0 > 0 sufficiently small
such that (27) holds and Ξǫ > 0. Here, note that choosing
ǫ0 smaller does not affect the positive definiteness of the
lower-right 3 × 3 block submatrix of Ξǫ. By construction of
ǫ0, ǫ1, ǫ2, ǫ3, there exist constants c1, c2 ∈ R>0 such that (19a)
holds for all x ∈ Ω, see also Section A-A. In addition, for this
choice of ǫ we have that Ξǫ > 0 and, as a result, there exists
αˆ := 12ǫ0λmin(P
TΞǫP) > 0 such that
(∇Wǫ(x))
TF (x) ≤ −αˆ‖x− x¯‖2
for all x ∈ Ω. Next, we consider the case when the disturbance
is present. Let χ satisfy 0 < χ < αˆ/(LW ‖B‖). Then, by
exploiting the Lipschitz property of ∇Wǫ,
(∇Wǫ(x))
T (F (x) +Bd) ≤ −αˆ‖x− x¯‖2 +∇Wǫ(x))
TBd
≤ −αˆ‖x− x¯‖2 + LW ‖B‖‖x− x¯‖‖d‖
≤ −(αˆ− LW ‖B‖χ)‖x− x¯‖
2 = −α‖x− x¯‖2
with α := αˆ − LW ‖B‖χ) > 0 and thus (19b) holds. This
concludes the proof of Theorem IV.1. 
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM V.1
Here we prove Theorem V.1. To do so, we rely on Gron-
wall’s inequality, which in general allows to bound the evo-
lution of continuous-time and discrete-time signals described
by differential and difference equations, respectively. Given the
hybrid nature of the time-triggered dynamics (21), we rely on a
version of Gronwall’s inequality for hybrid systems developed
in [24]. Adapted for our purposes, it states the following.
Proposition B.1. (Generalized Gronwall’s inequality [24]):
Let t 7→ y(t) ∈ R be a continuous signal, t 7→ p(t) ∈ R
be a continuously differentiable signal, r := {rj}
k−1
j=0 be a
nonnegative sequence of real numbers, q ≥ 0 a constant, and
E := {tj}
k+1
j=0 , k ∈ Z≥0 be a sequence of times satisfying
tj < tj+1 for all j ∈ {0, . . . , k}. Suppose that for all
t ∈ [t0, tk+1], the elements y, p, and r satisfy
y(t) ≤ p(t) + q
∫ t
t0
y(s)ds+
∑i(t)−1
j=0 rjy(tj+1)
with i(t) := max{i ∈ Z≥0 : ti ≤ t, ti ∈ E} for t < tk+1 and
i(tk+1) := k. Then,
y(t) ≤ p(t0)h(t0, t) +
∫ t
t0
h(s, t)p˙(s)ds
for all t ∈ [t0, tk+1] where for all t0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ tk+1,
h(s, t) := exp
(
q(t− s) +
∑i(t)−1
j=i(s) log(1 + rj)
)
.
We are now ready to prove Theorem V.1.
Proof of Theorem V.1: Let {{tlk}
Nl
k=0}
∞
l=0 be a sequence
of times satisfying the hypotheses. Consider a trajectory t 7→
x(t) of (21) with x(0) belonging to a neighborhood of x¯.
The definition of this neighborhood will show up later. Our
proof strategy involves showing the monotonic decrease of the
function Wǫ (cf. (17)) along this arbitrarily chosen trajectory.
Consider any t ∈ R≥0 such that t 6∈ {t
l
k}
Nl
k=0 for any l ∈ Z≥0
and x(t) ∈ Ω where Ω is defined by (18). With a slight abuse
of notation let l and k ∈ {0, . . . , Nl − 1} be fixed such that
t ∈ (tlk, t
l
k+1). Then, using the expression of F (x) = f(x) +
g(x)+h(x) given in (23), one can write the evolution of x at
t for the considered trajectory as
x˙(t) = F (x(t)) + g(x(tlk))− g(x(t)) + h(x(t
l
0))− h(x(t)).
(I) Dissipation inequality: Note that at t the evolution of Wǫ
is equal to the dot product between the gradient of Wǫ and
right-hand side of the above equation. Hence, we get
W˙ǫ(x(t)) = ∇Wǫ(x(t))
⊤
(
F (x(t)) + g(x(tlk))− g(x(t))
+ h(x(tl0))− h(x(t))
)
. (35)
From (19b), we have ∇Wǫ(x(t))
⊤F (x(t)) ≤ −α‖x(t)− x¯‖2.
Moreover, since maps ∇Wǫ, g, and h are globally Lipschitz
and ∇Wǫ(x¯) = 0, one has ‖∇Wǫ(x(t))‖ ≤ LW ‖x(t) − x¯‖,
‖g(x(tlk)) − g(x(t))‖ ≤ Lg‖x(t
l
k) − x(t)‖, and ‖h(x(t
l
0)) −
h(x(t))‖ ≤ Lh‖x(tl0)−x(t)‖. Using these bounds in (35), we
get
W˙ǫ(x(t)) ≤ −α‖x(t)− x¯‖
2 + LW ‖x(t)− x¯‖
(
Lg‖x(t)
− x(tlk)‖+ Lh‖x(t)− x(t
l
0)‖
)
. (36)
Next, we provide bounds on ‖x(t)−x(tlk)‖ and ‖x(t)−x(t
l
0)‖
in terms of ‖x(t) − x¯‖, t − tlk, and t − t
l
0. To reduce the
notational burden, we drop the superscript l from the time
instances {tli}
Nl
i=1. In addition, we define
xk := x(tk), ζk(t) := t− tk,
ζkj := ζj(tk) = tk − tj , ξ
l(t) := ζ0(t) = t− t0.
(II) Bounds on ‖x(t)− x(tl
k
)‖: Note that x(t) can be written
using (22) as the line integral
x(t)−xk =
∫ t
tk
f(x(s))ds+ ζk(t)g(xk) + ζk(t)h(x0)
=
∫ t
tk
(f(x(s))− f(xk))ds+ ζk(t)(f(xk)− f(x¯))
+ ζk(t)(g(xk)− g(x¯) + h(x0)− h(x¯)). (37)
Above, we have added and subtracted ζk(t)f(xk) and sub-
tracted f(x¯) + g(x¯) + h(x¯) as x¯ is an equilibrium. Using
Lipschitz bounds and triangle inequality in (37) we obtain
‖x(t)− xk‖ ≤ Lf
∫ t
tk
‖x(s)− xk‖ds (38)
+ ζk(t)(Lf + Lg)‖xk − x¯‖+ ζk(t)Lh‖x0 − x¯‖.
From above, we wish to obtain an upper bound on ‖x(t)−xk‖
that is independent of the state at times s ∈ (tk, t). To this
end, we employ Gronwall’s inequality as stated in a general
form in Proposition B.1. Drawing a parallelism between the
notations, for (38), we consider E = ∅, r = 0, y(t) = ‖x(t)−
xk‖, q = Lf , p(t) = ζk(t)(Lf +Lg)‖xk− x¯‖+ ζk(t)Lh‖x0−
x¯‖. Then, applying Proposition B.1 and integrating the then
obtained right-hand side yields
‖x(t)− xk‖ ≤
(
1 +
Lg
Lf
)
‖xk − x¯‖(e
Lfζk(t) − 1)
+Lh
Lf
‖x0 − x¯‖(e
Lfζk(t) − 1).
(39)
Bounding the above inequality using the triangle inequality
‖xk − x¯‖ ≤ ‖x(t)− xk‖+ ‖x(t)− x¯‖, collecting coefficients
of ‖x(t)− xk‖ on the left-hand side, and rearranging gives
‖x(t)− xk‖ ≤
Lh(e
Lfζk(t) − 1)
Lf − (Lf + Lg)(eLfζk(t) − 1)
‖x0 − x¯‖
+
(Lf + Lg)(e
Lfζk(t) − 1)
Lf − (Lf + Lg)(eLfζk(t) − 1)
‖x(t)− x¯‖. (40)
(III) Bounds on ‖x(t)− x(tl0)‖: Our next step is to provide
an upper bound on the term ‖x(t) − x0‖. Recall that the
considered trajectory satisfies (22) and so, the line integral
over the interval [t0, t] gives
x(t)− x0 =
∫ t
t0
f(x(s))ds +
∑k−1
j=0 ζ
j+1
j g(xj)
+ ζk(t)g(xk) + ξ
l(t)h(x0).
As done before, on the right-hand side, we add and subtract
the terms ξl(t)f(x0) and ξ
l(t)g(x0) and then subtract f(x¯)+
g(x¯) + h(x¯). This gives us
x(t) − x0 =
∫ t
t0
(f(x(s)) − f(x0))ds
+
∑k−1
j=0 ζ
j+1
j (g(xj)− g(x0)) + ζk(t)(g(xk)− g(x0))
+ ξl(t)(f(x0)− f(x¯) + g(x0)− g(x¯) + h(x0)− h(x¯))
By defining L := Lf + Lg + Lh, taking the norms, using the
global Lipschitzness, we obtain from above
‖x(t)− x0‖ ≤ Lf
∫ t
t0
‖x(s)− x0‖ds+ ξl(t)L‖x0 − x¯‖
+ Lg
∑k−1
j=0 ζ
j+1
j ‖xj − x0‖+ Lgζk(t)‖xk − x0‖.
Consider any tˆ ∈ [t, tk+1] and note that ζk(t) ≤ ζk(tˆ).
Using this bound and the fact that the first term in the above
summation is zero, we write
‖x(t)−x0‖ ≤ Lf
∫ t
t0
‖x(s)− x0‖ds+ ξl(t)L‖x0 − x¯‖
+ Lg
∑k−2
j=0 ζ
j+2
j+1‖xj+1 − x0‖+ Lgζk(tˆ)‖xk − x0‖.
We now apply Proposition B.1 to give a bound for the left-
hand side independent of x(s), s ∈ (t0, t]. In order to do
so, the elements corresponding to those in the Gronwall’s
inequality are: E = {tj}kj=0∪{tˆ}, y(t) = ‖x(t)−x0‖, p(t) =
ξl(t)L‖x0 − x¯‖, q = Lf , rj = Lgζ
j+2
j+1 for j = 0, . . . , k − 2,
and rk−1 = tˆ− tk. From Proposition B.1, we get
‖x(t)− x0‖ ≤ L‖x0 − x¯‖
∫ t
t0
h(s, t)ds, (41)
where h(s, t) = exp
( ∫ t
s
LfdT +
∑k−2
j=i(s) log(1 + ζ
j+2
j+1Lg) +
log(1 + Lgζk(tˆ))
)
and i(s) is as defined in Proposition B.1.
Using log(1 + x) ≤ x for x ≥ 0 and the fact that the
exponential is a monotonically increasing function, we get
h(s, t) ≤ exp
(
Lf(t− s) + Lg
∑k−2
j=i(s) ζ
j+1
j+1 + Lgζk(tˆ)
)
.
By noting that s ≤ i(s) + 1 and t ≤ tˆ, we can upper bound
the right-hand side as h(s, t) ≤ exp
(
Lf (t− s) + Lg(tˆ− s)
)
.
Since tˆ was chosen arbitrarily in the interval [t, tk+1], we
pick it equal to t. Thus, h(s, t) ≤ exp ((Lg + Lf )(t− s)).
Substituting this inequality in (41) yields
‖x(t)− x0‖ ≤ L‖x0 − x¯‖
∫ t
t0
e(Lf+Lg)(t−s)ds
= L
Lf+Lg
(e(Lf+Lg)ξ
l(t) − 1)‖x0 − x¯‖. (42)
This inequality when used in the right-hand side of the triangle
inequality ‖x0 − x¯‖ ≤ ‖x(t) − x0‖ + ‖x(t) − x¯‖ yields after
rearrangement the following
‖x0 − x¯‖ ≤
Lf + Lg
Lf + Lg − L(e(Lf+Lg)ξ
l(t) − 1)
‖x(t)− x¯‖.
(43)
Subsequently, using the above bound in (42) gives
‖x(t)− x0‖ ≤
L(e(Lf+Lg)ξ
l(t) − 1)
Lf + Lg − L(e(Lf+Lg)ξ
l(t) − 1)
‖x(t)− x¯‖.
(44)
Combining inequalities (40) and (43) we obtain
‖x(t)− xk‖ ≤
Lh(e
Lfζk(t) − 1)
Lf − (Lf + Lg)(eLfζk(t) − 1)
·
Lf + Lg
Lf + Lg − L(e(Lf+Lg)ξ
l(t) − 1)
‖x(t)− x¯‖
+
(Lf + Lg)(e
Lfζk(t) − 1)
Lf − (Lf + Lg)(eLf ζk(t) − 1)
‖x(t)− x¯‖ (45)
(IV) Monotonic decrease of Wǫ: Note first that follow-
ing (44) and using the bound ξl(t) ≤ ξ¯ yields
‖x(t)− x0‖ ≤
L(e(Lf+Lg)ξ¯ − 1)
Lf + Lg − L(e(Lf+Lg)ξ¯ − 1)
‖x(t)− x¯‖.
Using the definition of ξ¯, one gets e(Lf+Lg)ξ¯ − 1 =
β(Lf+Lg)
L(LWLh+β)
. Substituting this value in the above inequality
and simplifying the expression provides us
‖x(t)− x0‖ ≤ (β/(LWLh))‖x(t)− x¯‖. (46)
In a similar way, using the bound on ξl(t) and substituting the
value of e(Lf+Lg)ξ¯ − 1 in (45) and simplifying yields
‖x(t)− xk‖ ≤
(eLfζk(t) − 1)(L+ β/LW )
Lf − (Lf + Lg)(eLfζk(t) − 1)
‖x(t)− x¯‖.
Note that ζk(t) ≤ ζ¯ . Using this bound and the definition of ζ¯
in the above inequality gives
‖x(t)− xk‖ ≤
α−β
LWLg
‖x(t)− x¯‖. (47)
Finally, substituting (46) and (47) in (36) and using the fact
that β < α, we obtain W˙ǫ(x(t)) < 0. Recall that t ∈ R≥0
was chosen arbitrarily satisfying t 6∈ {tlk}
Nl
k=1 for any l ∈ Z≥0.
Therefore, Wǫ monotonically decreases at all times along the
trajectory except for a countable number of points. Further, the
map t 7→ Wǫ(x(t)) is continuous. Therefore, we conclude that
the trajectory initialized in a compact level set ofWǫ contained
in Ω converges asymptotically to the equilibrium point x¯. This
completes the proof. 
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